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PARADIGMS, METAPHORS, AND PUZZLE SOLVING
In order to understand the nature of orthodoxy in organization theory, it is necessary to understand the relationship between specific modes of theorizing and research and the world views that they reflect. It is useful to start with the concept of paradigm made popular by Kuhn (1962) , although the concept has been subjected to a wide and confusing range of interpretation (Morgan, 1979) . This is partly because Kuhn himself used the paradigm concept in not less than twenty-one different ways (Masterman, 1970), consistent with three broad senses of the term: (1) as a complete view of reality, or way of seeing; (2) as relating to the social organization of science in terms of schools of thought connected with particular kinds of scientific achievements, and 
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The importance of this point has not always been appreciated, and certainly has not been accorded the attention it deserves. Kuhn's notion that science is based on paradigms has generated a great deal of debate (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Suppe, 1974). This has led Kuhn to modify his position on certain points (Kuhn, 1970 (Kuhn, , 1974 (Kuhn, , 1977 (Kuhn, , 1979 , while retaining his commitment to the basic idea underlying the paradigm concept -that scientific communities are bound together by various bonds and commitments. The present article, following Burrell and Morgan (1979), builds upon this core insight, on the premise that the most fundamental of these bonds rests in the world view which scientists share, and which underwrites their approach to scientific inquiry. Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving reality. Any adequate analysis of the role of paradigms in social theory must uncover the core assumptions that characterize and define any given world view, to make it possible to grasp what is common to the perspectives of theorists whose work may otherwise, at a more superficial level, appear diverse and wide ranging.1 Any metatheoretical paradigm or world view may include different schools of thought, which are often different ways of approaching and studying a shared reality or world view (the metaphor level of Figure 1 ). It will be argued in this article that schools of thought in social science, those communities of theorists subscribing to relatively coherent perspectives, are based upon the acceptance and use of different kinds of metaphor as a foundation for inquiry. At the puzzle-solving level of analysis (Figure 1 ) it is possible to identify many kinds of research activities which seek to operationalize the detailed implications of the metaphor defining a particular school of thought. At this level of detailed analysis, many specific texts, models, and research tools vie for the attention of theorists, and much of the research and debate in the social sciences is focused at this level. This comprises what Kuhn (1962) has described as "normal science." In organization theory, for example, Thompson's (1967) book, Organizations in Action, has come to serve as a model statement and principal point of departure for theorists interested in contingency theory, which develops insights generated by the organismic metaphor (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The numerous propositions offered in Thompson's book have generated a great deal of puzzlesolving research, in which the metaphorical assumptions underlying Thompson's model are taken-for-granted as a way of understanding organizations.
By appreciating how specific puzzle-solving activities are linked to favored metaphors, which are in accord with a favored view of reality, the theorist can become much more aware of the role which he or she plays in relation to the social construction of scientific knowledge. As in the case of Mannheim's "urbanized" peasant boy, a cosmopolitan outlook in theorizing depends upon the theorist leaving, at some stage, the community of practitioners with whom he or she may feel at home, to appreciate the realms of theorizing defined by other paradigms, and the varieties of metaphors and methods through which theory and research can be conducted.
PARADIGMS AS ALTERNATIVE REALITIES
The role of paradigms as views of social reality was recently explored in detail by Burrell and Morgan (1979), who argued that social theory in general, and organization theory in particular, could be usefully analyzed in terms of four broad world views, which were reflected in different sets of metatheoretical assumptions, about the nature of science, the subjective-objective dimension, and the nature of society, the dimension of regulation-radical change (Figure 2 proach and perspective, but sharing common fundamental assumptions about the nature of the reality that they address.
The functionalist paradigm is based upon the assumption that society has a concrete, real existence, and a systemic character oriented to produce an ordered and regulated state of affairs. It encourages an approach to social theory that focuses upon understanding the role of human beings in society. Behavior is always seen as being contextually bound in a real world of concrete and tangible social relationships. The ontological assumptions encourage a belief in the possibility of an objective and value-free social science in which the scientist is distanced from the scene which he or she is analyzing through the rigor and technique of the scientific method. The functionalist perspective is primarily regulative and pragmatic in its basic orientation, concerned with understanding society in a way which generates useful empirical knowledge. others have argued, they do so symbolically, attempting to make the world concrete by giving it form. Through language, science, art, and myth, for example, humans structure their world in meaningful ways. These attempts to objectify a reality embody subjective intentions in the meanings which underwrite the symbolic constructs which are used. Knowledge and understanding of the world are not given to human beings by external events; humans attempt to objectify the world through means of essentially subjective processes. As Cassirer has emphasized, all modes of symbolic understanding possess this quality. Words, names, concepts, ideas, facts, observations, etc., do not so much denote external "things," as conceptions of things activated in the mind by a selective and meaningful form of noticing the world, which may be shared with others. They are not to be seen as a representation of a reality "out there, The use of a metaphor serves to generate an image for studying a subject. This image can provide the basis for detailed scientific research based upon attempts to discover the extent to which features of the metaphor are found in the subject of inquiry. Much of the puzzle-solving activity of normal science is of this kind, with scientists attempting to examine, operationalize, and measure detailed implications of the metaphorical insight upon which their research is implicitly or explicitly based. Such confinement of attention calls for a great deal of prior and somewhat irrational commitment to the image of the subject of investigation, for any one metaphorical insight provides but a partial and one-sided view of the phenomenon to which it is applied.
The creative potential of metaphor depends upon there being a degree of difference between the subjects involved in the metaphorical process. For example, a boxer may be described as "a tiger in the ring." In choosing the term "tiger" we conjure up specific impressions of a fierce animal, moving at times with grace, stealth, power, strength, and speed in aggressive acts directed at its prey. By implication, the metaphor suggests that the boxer possesses these qualities in fighting his opponent. The use of this metaphor requires that the tiger's orange and black striped fur, four legs, claws, fangs, and deafening roar be ignored in favor of an emphasis upon the characteristics that boxer and tiger have in common. Metaphor is thus based upon but partial truth; it requires of its user a somewhat one-sided abstraction in which certain features are emphasized and others suppressed in a selective comparison. Figure 3 illustrates the crucial significance of difference in a metaphor. If the two subjects brought together are perceived to be completely unalike, e.g., boxer and saucepan (Figure 3a) , or are seen as almost identical, e.g., boxer and man (Figure 3c ), the metaphorical process produces either nonsensical or weak imagery. The most powerful use of metaphor arises in instances typified in Figure 3b , in which the differences be- Etzioni, 1960). The details of these machine models are drawn from mechanical concepts. They attribute principal importance, for example, to the concepts of structure and technology in the definition of organizational characteristics. Machines are technological entities in which the relationship between constituent elements forms a structure. In classical and bureaucratic organization theory the principal emphasis is placed upon the analysis and design of the formal structure of an organization and its technology. Indeed, these theories essentially constitute blueprints for such design; they seek to design organizations as if they were machines, and the human beings expected to work within such mechanical structures are to be valued for their instrumental abilities. Taylor's conception of economic man and Weber's concept of the faceless bureaucrat extend the principles of the machine metaphor to define the view of human nature which best suits the organizational machine. Indeed, as Weber suggests, the bureaucratic mode of organization develops the more perfectly the more this mode of organization upon the nature of life activity. An organism is typically seen as a combination of elements, differentiated yet intecalculation, such as love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements (Weber, 1946:216). Furthermore, the operation of the whole bureaucratic enterprise is judged in terms of its efficiency, another concept deriving from the mechanical conception of an organization as an instrument for achieving predetermined ends.
The other major metaphor in organization theory is that of the organism. The term "organism" has come to be used to refer to any system of mutually connected and dependent parts constituted to share a common life and focuses atten- The radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms offer a similar kind of challenge, which draws attention to the political and exploitative aspects of organizational life. From the perspective of these paradigms, both functionalist and interpretive theory fail to understand that the apparent order in social life is not so much the result of an adaptive process or a free act of social construction, as the consequence of a process of social domination. Organizations from this point of view oppress and exploit, and embody a logic which sets a basis for their eventual destruction. The order which interpretive theory seeks to understand, and which functionalist theory seeks to enhance, is from the radical humanist and radical structuralist perspectives, a superficial order masking fundamental contradictions. The challenge to organization theory emanating from these paradigms is to penetrate beneath the surface appearance of the empirical world, and reveal the deep structure of forces which account for the nature, existence, and ongoing transformation of organizations within the total world situation. Organization theory from the radical humanist and radical structuralist perspectives cannot provide an adequate understanding of the nature of organization through an exclusive focus upon organizations and behavior in organizations. These paradigms suggest that the study of such phenomena must be linked to the wider mode of societal organization to which they give detailed empirical content and form.
The challenge presented to orthodox organization theory by these different paradigms is to rethink the very nature of the subject to which it is addressed. Different paradigms embody world views which favor metaphors that constitute the nature of organizations in fundamentally different ways, and which call for a complete rethinking as to what organization theory should be about. The challenge raised relates to the ground assumptions upon which theorizing is based, and can only be settled through a consideration of the appropriateness of these rival grounds as a basis for organizational analysis.
